We introduce a typed variant of Safe Ambients, named Secure Safe Ambients (SSA), whose type system allows behavioral invariants of ambients to be expressed and verified. The most significant aspect of the type system is its ability to capture both explicit and implicit process and ambient behavior: process types account not only for immediate behavior, but also for the behavior resulting from capabilities a process acquires during its evolution in a given context. Based on that, the type system provides for static detection of security attacks such as Trojan Horses and other combinations of malicious agents.
Introduction
Mobile Ambients [6] are named agents or locations that enclose collections of running processes, possibly including nested sub-ambients. Safe Ambients [12] are a variant of Mobile Ambients. The two calculi differ in the underlying notion of interaction: in Mobile Ambients, interaction is "one-sided", in that one of the two partners in a move or open action simply undergoes the action. In Safe Ambients, instead, the reduction relation requires actions to synchronize with corresponding co-actions. To exemplify, consider the ambients and described below:
Mobile Ambients

ÓÔ Ò Ò ℄ Ò Ò ℄
The brackets ℄ represent ambient boundaries, " " denotes parallel composition, and "." enforces sequential execution. Given the above configuration, the ambient may enter , by exercising the capability " Ò ", and reduce to ÓÔ Ò Ò Ò ℄℄. Then may dissolve the boundary provided by by exercising ÓÔ Ò , and reduce to Ò Ò ℄.
Neither of the two reductions is legal in Safe Ambients. To obtain the behavior we just described, the two ambients and should be written as follows:
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Overview
The type system we discuss in this paper provides for static, type-driven verification of security. It allows the definition of security policies for ambients, and provides mechanisms for static detection of any attempt to break those policies. In particular, the type system detects security attacks based on implicit (and undesired or malicious) acquisition of capabilities by hostile agents such as those described in the previous examples. As argued in [12] , the presence of co-capabilities is essential for an accurate static characterization of processes in the type system: our choice of Safe Ambients as the basis for our type system is motivated by the same reasons.
There are three key ingredients to the type system. Ambient Domains. Ambients are classified by ambient domains (also called protection domains or simply domains): each domain has an associated behavior that ambients in the domain share and must comply with, and an associated security policy that protects the ambients in the domain from undesired interactions with the surrounding context.
Type-level capabilities and Process Types.
Process types describe process behavior using domains as the unit of abstraction. The term-level capabilities available to processes are abstracted upon in the type system by resorting to type-level capabilities. Process types are defined in terms of sets of type capabilities: to exemplify, if is, say, an ambient of domain and È is a (well-typed) process exercising the term-level capability Ò , then the type of È traces this behavior by including the type-level capability Ò .
To gain accuracy in the description of ambient behavior, the type system traces the nesting level at which the effect of exercising a capability may be observed. This is accomplished by introducing chemical abstract model, where exercising a capability corresponds, in the typing rules, to releasing a type-level capability, or molecule. Molecules are classified as plain, light, and heavy: plain molecules are released at the nesting level of the process exercising the corresponding capability, light molecules at upper level (the level of the enclosing ambient), while heavy molecules are released within ambients. Molecules react with co-molecules (corresponding to co-capabilities) released at the same nesting level. Thus, in the chemical metaphor, type checking corresponds to a chromatographic analysis in which each element of different weight is precisely determined.
Security Constraints. Each ambient domain has an associated set of security constraints that define the security policy for that domain: the constraints establish the access rights for ambients crossing the boundary of any of the ambients in the domain.
Contributions
We prove two main results for our type system. The first is subject reduction, the second is a rather strong form of type safety showing that types provide a safe approximation of behavior: specifically, we show that if a process È running inside a context may (after any number of reduction steps of ) exercise a capability on some name, and is well-typed, then the corresponding type capability is traced by the static type of È . For that we introduce a new and powerful notion of residual. As a corollary, we then deduce that well-typed processes comply with the security policies established by ambients.
We also define a type-checking algorithm that computes minimum types and, more importantly, an algorithm for type reconstruction: we prove both sound and complete. Type reconstruction is particularly important for our purposes, as it infers the behavior of ambient domains, thus leaving the programmer with the only task of specifying the domains of ambients, and their associated security policies.
We continue by studying a distributed variant of SSA, where each ambient carries its own type environment along with it, and type-checking is performed locally by the ambient at any time other ambients cross its own boundaries. The distributed variant of the calculus and its type system are particularly interesting in perspective, in view of a practical implementation. In a highly distributed system it is clearly unrealistic to rely on the assumption that type checking may access information on all the components of the system. Accordingly, in the distributed version of the calculus, we dispense with global security and type soundness, and replace them by local type checking and security analysis. A typed version of reduction complements these analyses by allowing ambient boundaries to be crossed only by ambients satisfying the type and security checks performed, just in time, by the ambient whose domain is being crossed.
The study of the distributed version yields, as a byproduct, a further interesting result. Looking at the dynamic checks performed upon reduction, one discovers that they correspond to the type and security checks performed by the three components of the security architecture of the Java Virtual Machine: the Class Loader, the Bytecode Verifier, and the Security Manager.
Finally we study the system in the presence of communication primitives. This extension, absent from [3] , is non-trivial, as capabilities, as well as names, can be exchanged in communications. Therefore characterizing ambient and process behavior in the presence of communications involves tracing not only the capabilities a process may acquire by mobility interactions with the environment, but also those that may be obtained via explicit communication.
Plan of the paper
Section 2 reviews the syntax and reduction semantics of (Secure) Safe Ambients. Section 3 defines the type system, while Section 4 focuses on type soundness and safety. Section 5 introduces the algorithmic systems, and proves them sound and complete. Section 6 shows how to define a security layer on top of the type system, and how the type system may be used enforce and verify security properties. In Section 7 we define a distributed version of SSA, and discuss how it relates to the security architecture of the JVM. in Section 8 we extend our system with communications. A short section concludes the presentation. Proofs of the main results are given in separate appendixes.
The language
The terms of our language are those of Safe Ambients with the only difference that the types of (ambient) names are domains. These are type-level constants used to identify ambients that satisfy the same behavioral invariants and share common security policies: instead of associating such invariants and policies to each ambient we rather define them for domains, and then group ambients in domains.
Processes
Besides being a design choice, the introduction of domains is motivated by technical reasons. An alternative, and more informative, notion of ambient type could be defined by associating each ambient with the set of term-level capabilities that ambient may exercise. The resulting type system would certainly provide a more accurate characterization of process and ambient behavior, but it would also incur into a number of technical problems arising from the dependency of these types on terms 1 . On the other hand, our use of protection domains is well motivated and justified by what is nowadays common practice for languages and systems supporting code mobility [10] . 1 One problem with that solution is that types are not preserved by structural congruence. For instance, the terḿ µ´ µ Ò ℄ Ó Ò ℄ would not be typeable, as the type should contain all the capabilities can exercise: yet cannot contain Ò , as is in the scope of a nested binder. If we exchange the position of the two binders, as in´ µ´ µ Ò ℄ Ó Ò ℄ the term becomes typeable. The use of domains resolves the problem: both terms are well-typed when and are domains (thus type constants rather than sets of term-level capabilities).
Reduction
The reduction relation for SSA derives from the one defined for Safe Ambients. We let É Ê and Ë range over arbitrary processes.
and is the standard structural equivalence relation for ambients, that is the least congruence relation that is a commutative monoid for ¼ and and closed under the following rules:
Here fn´È µ denotes the set of free names of È , defined as:
Here Ô ¾ Ò Ó Ò ÓÙØ ÓÓÙØ ÓÔ Ò ÓÓÔ Ò and, as it is costumary, we work modulo «-conversion of bound names and variables.
Type System
Ambient domains, ranged over by À, provide the type-level unit of abstraction: in the type system, the effect of exercising a capability is observed on domains rather than on ambients. We define process types in terms of type-level capabilities as follows:
Type Capabilities
We use this definition of structural reduction instead of the more standard 
Process types describe the capabilities that processes may exercise, and trace the nesting level at which the effect of exercising a capability may be observed. The three components of process types identify those levels: if È has type È, then È describes the effects that can be observed at the level of the ambient enclosing È , È describes the capabilities observed at the level of È , and finally, È represents the capabilities that are exercised within È , whenever È is an ambient of the form È ¼ ℄. 
Environments and Type Rules
We define two classes of environments, namely Type Environments, denoted by , and Domain Environments, denoted by ¥:
Type Environments
Ambient Names Ambient Domains Domain Environments ¥ Ambient Domains Process Types
Type environments associate to each ambient name the domain it belongs to, while domain environments associate to each domain the type that is shared by all its ambients. Thus, while type environments partition ambients into domains, domain environments convey information about potential interactions among domains, and enforce behavioral invariants for processes enclosed in ambients in each domain.
Definition 3.1 (Closure and Boundedness).
Let ¥ be a domain environment, È a process type, and and À be ambient domains. We define the following notation:
The closure condition on process types formalizes the intuition that processes may exercise all the capabilities of the ambients they may open. The boundedness of È by ensures that the process type ¥´ µ provides a sound approximation of the type È of any process enclosed in (ambients of) domain . This is expressed by the first two inclusions, which reflect the different nesting level at which one may observe the behavior of ambients and their enclosed processes. The last inclusion handles the case of domains whose ambients may be opened: in that case ambient boundaries are dissolved, and consequently the behavior of the processes unleashed as a result of the open may be observed at the nesting level of the ambients where they were originally enclosed. Finally, the closure condition for domains enforces the previous invariants in the presence of mobility: the behavior of an ambient of domain must account for the behavior of ambients entering , as well as for the behavior of ambients exiting (since lets these ambients out, then it is virtually responsible for their behavior). The import of the closure and boundedness conditions is exemplified in Section 3.2 by the typing of Example 1.1 and Example 1.2 from the introduction. Figure 1 . They derive judgments of the form ¥ È È, where is a type environment, ¥ is a domain environment, and ÁÑ ´ µ ÓÑ´¥µ (that is, the image of is contained in the domain of ¥).
The rules (DEAD), (PAR), (REPL), and (RESTR) are standard. The typing of prefixes (in the (ACTION) rules) is motivated by the observations we made earlier: the effect of exercising the capabilities Ò ÓÙØ Ó Ò and ÓÓÔ Ò may be observed at the level of the enclosing ambient. Dually, ÓÔ Ò , and ÓÓÙØ may be observed at the level of the continuation process.
As for (AMB), the rule stipulates that an ambient È ℄ has at least the type that ¥ associates with the domain of , i.e. ¥´ µ, provided that bounds the type of È in ¥. The (AMB) rule is technically interesting, as, unlike its companion rule in previous type systems for Mobile (and Safe) Ambients, it establishes a precise relationship between the type of an ambient and the process running inside it. This relationship, which is essential for tracing implicit behavior, can be expressed in our type system thanks to the three-level structure of our process types.
The format of the rules (DEAD) and (AMB) could be simplified and made perhaps more intuitive, by stipulating that the types deduced in the consequences of the two rules are the types´ µ and ¥´ µ respectively. More precisely, we could have used the following two rules instead of the respective rules in Figure 1 (note the simpler premises):
As a matter of facts, these rules are those used for the type inference algorithm defined in Section 5. On the other hand, here this simplification would require the introduction of a subsumption rule like the following one: which is easily shown to be admissible in the type system, as presently defined (Lemma A.7).
We conclude with the statement of the subject reduction theorem, whose proof in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.3 (Subject Reduction).
If ¥ È È and È ©É, then ¥ É È.
Examples
We illustrate the behavior of the typing rules with the two systems of Examples 
Type Safety
The operational import of the type system is established by showing that process types provide a safe approximation of process behavior. In that direction, we introduce the relation È · « that defines the behavior of a process È in terms of the capabilities « that È may exercise (at nesting level ¾ ) while evolving in a context. Then we connect the type system with this notion of process behavior by means of a safety result stating that, given a well-typed process È in a well-typed context, for every « such that È · « , the type capability corresponding to « is traced by the type of È : in other words, no action goes untraced by the type system. Below, we focus on a simplified case of type safety, one that assumes that processes are "normalized" to the form´ µÈ where È contains no restriction . This assumption simplifies the statement and the proof of the type safety theorem: in Appendix D we show how the result can be generalized to arbitrary processes.
We start by introducing a relation of "immediate exhibition", noted È « : the relation is defined in Figure 2 by induction on the structure of the process È . Next we define a tagging mechanism for processes,
Exhibiting a capability by a technique similar to the one in [18] . Let us start with giving the intuition first. Given a process È , we consider its syntax tree and tag some of its nodes with the symbol ℄. So for example, if È is the process È ½ È ¾ ´ µÈ ¿ ℄ then, say, È ½ ℄ È ¾ ´ µ℄È ¿ ℄ denotes the process È in which we tagged the ambient and the subprocess È ¿ occurring therein.
Having tagged a particular occurrence of È , we instrument reduction so that every process interacting with this occurrence gets tagged: if the tag is initially applied to an ambient, this technique allows us to trace all the processes that "got in touch" with that ambient 3 . Tags are propagated based on the idea of an ambient as a paint pot: any ambient exiting a tagged ambient is tagged:
This corresponds to tracing the interactions considered in the Chinese Wall Security Policy [2] and so is every process unleashed by opening a tagged ambient:
Following the intuition that a process exercises all the capabilities of the processes it opens, we also have:
Technically, the definition is only slightly more complex. First we define tagged processes:
Tagged Processes
We use the convention that ℄ bounds more than the parrallel composition. Therefore ℄È É denotes´℄È µ É (and, of course, ℄ È ℄ and ℄« È respectively denote ℄´ È ℄µ and ℄´« È µ). We call untagged processes those processes in which no tag occurs. Second, we need to extend structural congruence to tagged processes. Given our assumption that processes are in "normal" form, structural congruence is extended to tagged processes by simply adding the following additional clauses 4 :
The structural congruence relation on tagged processes is then the smallest congruence on tagged processes that is a commutative monoid for ¼ and and is closed under the rules above and those of Section 2.
Third, we define the reduction rules for all possible cases that result from whether the processes involved in a reduction step are tagged or not. To ease the definition, we indicate with ℄ AE a possibly absent tag, and with ℄ the -th occurrence of the tag ℄. With this notation, the tagged version of reduction is defined by the rules in Figure 3 plus the rules (context) and (struct) of Section 2. Now we can give a precise definition of the residuals of a process evolving in a context: intuitively these are all the tagged processes that result from tagging the process in question, and reducing it in the given context. The definition relies on the following notion of (restriction-free) context:
µÈ be a process, with È containing no restrictions. 4 In Appendix D the definition is refined to handle restrictions and scope extrusion.
1. An occurrence of È is a path ¡ in the syntax tree of È . We denote with È ¡ the subprocess of È occurring at ¡, and with È ¡ ℄ the context obtained from È by substituting a hole for the subprocess occurring at ¡. Hence È È ¡ È ¡ ℄.
2. Given a tagged process È , we denote by È the process obtained by erasing 5 all tags occurring in È .
3. Let ¡ be an occurrence of an untagged process È . The set of residuals of ¡ in È is defined as follows:
We can finally generalize the notion of capability exhibition to process occurrences. 
However it is important to notice that according to Definition 4.1 while the process´È É Êµ is a residual of ÓÔ Ò È in the redex, but neither´È Éµ, nor È , nor É, nor Ê are residuals of that occurence. The reason resides in the reduction rule (struct) in Section 2 which applies structural equivalence to the redex but not to the reductum. Even though È or É are not residuals of ÓÔ Ò È their behavior is included in the behavior of´È É Êµ. This holds thanks to the Definition 4.2 and the rules in Figure 2 . We gave our definitions as such, since we wanted that in a one step reduction every tagged process had at most one residual, so that to be able to easily follow in the proofs the behavior of the residuals. In order not to loose any behavior, we defined our reduction rules in Figure 3 so that in the reductum we tagged the "most general"
residual. This explains why, say, ÓÔ Ò È ℄ ÓÓÔ Ò É Ê℄ reduces in one step to È ℄´É Êµ rather than to È ℄É ℄Ê.
The last step consists in using this definition to state the type safety theorem, whose proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.3 (Type Safety). Let´
µÈ be a process, with È containing no restriction, ¡ be an occurrence of È and let
To exemplify, consider the ambient Ó Ò ÓÔ Ò ℄. If taken in isolation, this ambient only exhibits the capabilities Ó Ò and ÓÔ Ò . If, instead, we take the parallel composition
then the ambient ℄ also exhibits Ò as a result of the interaction with the context. In fact, if we start tagging ℄ in (1) above, the result of tagged reduction is as follows:
Now, Theorem 4.3 ensures that if we type the process (1), the fact that the residual Ò ℄ of exhibits Ò is traced by the type associated to the domain of . In fact, the result is even stronger, as it ensures that the type system traces the behavior of any process that interacts with the process occurrence of interest. For example, if we take the composition ℄ Ó Ò ÓÓÙØ ℄ Ò ÓÙØ Ò ℄, the result of tagged reduction is ℄ ℄ ℄ Ò ℄, and Theorem 4.3 ensures that the type of (the domain of) traces the type-level capability corresponding to Ò , since it is exhibited by the residual Ò ℄.
Algorithmic Systems
The type system given in Figure 1 is not algorithmic as the rules (DEAD) and (AMB) are not syntax-directed. However, it is easy to state the type rules so that they form an algorithmic system.
Typing Algorithm
The algorithmic type system finds the minimal type of a term under a given set of domain assumptions ¥ and type assumptions . The system results from the type system of Figure 1 by replacing the rules (DEAD) and (AMB) by those stated at the end of Section 3.1, and replacing the (ACTION) and (PAR) with the rules in Figure 4 : the only subtlety is the side condition to the rule (ACTION ¾ ), which defines È ¼ as the minimum È ¼ that contains È and is closed in ¥ (i.e. such that ¥ È ¼ is derivable). Collectively, the new rules constitute the core of an algorithm that given ¥ , and È as input, returns the type È as output. The side condition to the rule (ACTION ¾ ) uses the following closure operator for process types. (PAR) The existence of minimum (with respect to point-wise set containment) types and of an algorithm computing them are interesting and useful properties. Yet, leaving a programmer with the task of providing a domain environment ¥ as input to the type checking algorithm is a very strong requirement. Below, we show that this task can be dispensed with, as domain environments can be reconstructed automatically. In principle, providing a coherent ¥ for which the typing algorithm does not fail is straightforward. Given a process È , let be the set of domain names occurring in È , and let be a type environment that assigns a domain in to every name in È . Now, denote by È sat the process type whose components contain all the possible type capabilities over , and let ¥ sat be the saturated type environment such that ÓÑ´¥µ and ¥ sat´ µ È sat for all ¾ ÓÑ´¥µ. It is easy to verify that there always exists a process type È such that ¥ sat È È is derivable: to see that, observe that ¥ sat´ µ provides a sound approximation of the behavior of every ambient (and process) occurring in È (indeed, ¥ sat È È sat holds). On the other hand, it is also clear that ¥ sat is not very useful as a domain environment, as it provides the coarsest possible approximation of behavior: this is problematic in view of our perspective use of types to check and enforce security, as the coarser the approximation of a process' behavior, the less likely for the process to pass the security checks imposed by its environment.
Type Reconstruction
Type reconstruction computes the minimum coherent domain environment ¥ such that a given term type checks. The ordering over environments derives by extending the containment relation to environments, 
Definition 5.4 (Domain Closures
Both these operators, as well as the ÈÖÓ ÐÓ×ÙÖ operator of Definition 5.1, are easily seen to be welldefined and monotone: furthermore they can be effectively computed by (always terminating) algorithms. An example is given in Figure 5 .
ÒÚ ÐÓ×ÙÖ ( The system for type reconstruction is defined in Figure 6 : the (Ê-ACTION) rules are the same as the corresponding algorithmic (ACTION) rules, (Ê-REPL) and (Ê-RESTR) are defined as their corresponding rules in Figure 1 . In all the rules, the subscript indicates a finite set of ambient domains: in (Ê-DEAD), is the domain environment defined by ´ µ ´ µ for every ¾ . The rules describe an algorithm that, given a process È and a type environment such that fn´È µ ÓÑ´ µ returns a process type È and a domain environment ¥. More precisely, given a process È and a type environment , let be the set of ambient domains occurring in the type assumptions of and in the types of restrictions in È . Then, there exists one and only one process type È and environment ¥ such that ¥ È È: we denote this process type and domain environment respectively with Ê type´ È µ and Ê env´ È µ. Proof. See Appendix C.
Corollary 5.6 (Minimal typing)
. Let È be a process and a type environment such that fn´È µ ÓÑ´ µ.
Accordingly, in the typed syntax it is enough to specify the domains of the ambients occurring in È : the type checker will then generate the minimal types for each domain and for È .
Security
Security policies are expressed by means of security constraints, and new environments help associate security constraints with ambient domains:
Security Environments
¦ Ambient Domains Security Constraints
A security environment establishes the security structure for a given system of processes and ambients.
Given domain and type environments ¥ and , and a well-typed process È , we may then verify that È is secure in ¦ by checking that ¥ satisfies ¦. The definition of satisfaction, denoted ¥ ¦, requires ÓÑ´¦µ ÓÑ´¥µ and depends on the structure of the security constraints, which in turn depend on the sort of security policy one wishes to express. We discuss three options below. The security model arising from domain constraints is related to the security policy of the JDK 1.1.x. In JDK 1.0.x all non local definitions are considered as insecure. The same applies under JDK 1.1.x with the difference that a class loaded from the network can become trusted if it is digitally signed by a party the user has decided to trust (in our case a domain in Ò ).
Domain Constraints
Capability Constraints lead to finer protection policies that identify the type-level capabilities that entering and exiting ambients may exercise 6 . These constraints may be expressed by tables of the form Ë Ò È Ò ÓÙØ È ÓÙØ , whose entries are process types. If is a domain, and ¦´ µ Ë then:
È Ò defines the only capabilities that processes entering ambients of domain have permission to exercise: the three sets È Ò , È Ò , and È Ò specify the capabilities that can be exercised, respectively, at the level of the entering process, at the level of the enclosing ambient, and inside the entering process. The first specification is useful to prevent information leakage, the second to control the local interactions of the entering ambient, and the third is useful when opening (or entering) the entered process.
È ÓÙØ is the table defining the capabilities that are granted to processes exiting out of ambients of domain , with the three entries È ÓÙØ , È ÓÙØ , and È ÓÙØ defined as above.
In this option ¥ ¦ if and only if, for all , in ÓÑ´¥µ, Ò ¾ ×ÝÒ´¥´ µ ¥´ µ µ implies ¥´ µ ¦´ µ Ò, and, ÓÙØ ¾ ×ÝÒ´¥´ µ ¥´ µ µ implies ¥´ µ ¦´ µ ÓÙØ. Capability constraints are loosely related to the permission collections used in the JDK 1.2 architecture (also known as Java 2) to enforce security policies based on access control and stack inspection.
Constraint Formulas. More refined policies can be expressed by resorting to a fragment of first order logic. The fragment is given below, where Å ranges over type capabilities, over ambient domain names (and domain variables), and over , , and .
The notion of formula satisfiability is easily extended to the security environments, namely ¥ ¦ if an only if for all in ÓÑ´¥µ, ¥ ¦´ µ. Since we work on finite models, satisfiability is always decidable.
Note that the first-order fragment is powerful enough to encode quantification on actions as well as formulas such as Ô ¾ ×ÝÒ ´Ä Åµ. Based on that, we can express refined security properties: for example, the formula Ò ¾ ×ÝÒ ´ µ Ò ¾ ×ÝÒ ´ µ µ Ò ¾ allows one to prevent arbitrary nested Trojan Horses (an ambient entering a second ambient that enters a third ambient that can enter ), since it requires that all ambients that are granted the right to enter domain may only be entered by ambients that already have the right to enter .
Independently of the structure of constraints, given a process È and a type environment for the names occurring free in È , we say that and È satisfy a security policy ¦ if and only if Ê env´ È µ ¦. As a corollary of Theorem 4.3 we have that Ê env´ È µ ¦ implies that no ambient occurring in È can violate the security policies defined in ¦.
Distributed SSA
The type systems presented in the previous sections have interesting properties and significant operational impact. Yet, there is also a fundamental weakness to them, in that they rely on the assumption that global information is available on ambient domains and their types: a derivation for a typing judgment ¥ È È requires that the environments ¥ and contain assumptions for all the ambients occurring in È and for all those ambients' domains. This is clearly unrealistic for a foundational calculus for wide-area distributed computations and systems. In this section we address the problem by presenting a distributed variant of SSA. In the distributed version, which we call DSSA, each ambient (i.e. each "location" in the system of processes) carries a type and a domain environment. The syntax of DSSA processes is defined by the following productions:
where « ¥, and are defined as in the previous sections, and Ë is a capability constraint.
To get an intuition of DSSA ambients, it is useful to think of Java class files. Class files include applet bytecode together with type and security information used for bytecode verification and dynamic linking. In particular a class file declares the types of all methods and fields the associated class defines (the type assertions), and the types of all the identifiers the class refers to (the type assumptions) [13] . When downloading a class file, the verifier checks (among other properties) that the bytecode satisfies the type assertions under the type assumptions. A DSSA ambient È ℄ Ë ¥ can be understood as a class file, where È ℄ represents the bytecode, and the pair ¥ corresponds to the type assertions and assumptions. Intuitively, for any name occurring in È ℄, the process type ¥´ ´ µµ may be thought of as a type assertion, if or is the name of an ambient contained in È , or else as a type assumption if occurs in a capability of È but È contains no ambient named .
Typed Reduction
The type system for DSSA is the same as that defined for SSA. DSSA ambients are typed, statically, by simply disregarding their associated environments: the latter are used in the dynamic type-checks performed upon reduction. The new reduction relation is based on structural congruence, which is defined as in Section 2 with the only exception of the following rule: 
The rule (in) extends the corresponding rule for SSA with additional conditions ensuring that the reduction takes place only when the local environments of the two ambients involved in the move are mutually compatible and the security constraints fulfilled. First, the rule requires the environment of to be extended by the environment of (in the reductum carries the environment ¥ that extends ¥ ). Second, the reduction requires the entering ambient to´ µ be well-typed in the extended environments, and´ µ to satisfy the security constraints of . Finally, the condition ¥ ´ µ ÓÙÒ × ¥´ ´ µµ requires that the entering ambient does not modify the external behavior of : lets new ambients in only if they comply with its own local behavior discipline. 7 The rule (out) performs similar type and security checks: note, in particular, that if were well typed then the type check on would be unnecessary. Yet, we cannot make any a priori assumption about and its type, and therefore we must check that the exiting ambient has the type it is supposed to have (otherwise the security check would be of no use).
A closer look at the rule (in) shows an interesting correspondence between the constraints enforced by the target of the move and the functions implemented by the three component of the JVM security system: the Class Loader, the Bytecode Verifier, and the Security Manager [13] . ¥ ¥ ¡¥ ¡ : Local (to ) assumptions on the type of each name hide remote assumptions for that name. As a consequence, the entering agent cannot spoof a definition of the target host . This is the security policy implemented by the JVM Class Loader, which provides name-space separation and prevents type-confusion attacks for spoofing.
Ò È É℄ Ë ¥ ¥´ ´ µµ : The target of the move, ambient , checks that the entering agent has the type it declares to have, in case ¾ ÓÑ´ µ, or that expects it to have, when ¾ ÓÑ´ µ. This is the security policy enforced by the bytecode verifier.
¥´ ´ µµ Ë Ò :
The ambient checks that the entering agent performs only actions that are explicitly permitted by the security constraints defined by Ë Ò. This is essentially the security policy enforced by the Security Manager: the difference is that the Security Manager performs these checks dynamically (when the agent is already entered and requires to perform the action), whereas in our system they are performed at load time.
Note that, intuitively, all the above checks are performed by , the ambient whose boundary is crossed. That ambient does not trust foreign code, it just trusts, of course, its own implementation of the type checking algorithm which is used to dynamically verify foreign code: verification is based on the (type) information foreign code carries along with it, according to the common proof-carrying-code practice [14] .
Type Safety
Most of the properties relating the type system and reduction carry over from SSA to DSSA. However the key property of DSSA, where the essence of distribution resides, is the following, stronger, version of Theorem 4.3. Again, the theorem is stated for the simplified case of "normalized" distributed processes, i.e. for processes with all restrictions extruded to the outermost scope. It is based on the same definitions of residual and exhibition of the previous section (but stated for the new typed reduction): the additional information attached to ambients is simply disregarded. The difference between this theorem, whose proof is sketched in Theorem B.5, and Theorem 4.3 is that the statement of the former does not require the context È to be well typed, but just that the ambient occurrence can be typed under the assumptions it comes with. Accordingly, every ambient that type-checks under the environment it carries along with it will only exhibit capabilities that are already in its static type, even though the context it interacts with is not well-typed 8 . This is an interesting result for wide-area distributed systems, where global typing may not be possible: for example, distinct subsystems may have incompatible type assumptions. Even then, typed reduction allows secure interactions provided that local type safety exists or can be ensured. Hence, an agent can confidently let another ambient in or out even if the former is evolving in a possibly ill-typed context: as long as typed reduction is respected, the security constraints that agent defines are never violated. The dual view holds as well: an agent can confidently enter or exit another ambient even if the latter is ill-typed: the reduction semantics ensures that the security constraints defined by the former are never violated.
Communications
The analyses we developed in the previous sections were targeted to the combinatorial kernel of Safe Ambients. We now discuss their extension to the case of ambients with communication primitives: the extension is nontrivial, as communication may involve exchange of capabilities which, once received, may be exercised and thus affect the behavior of the ambient where they are received.
We first briefly introduce the constructs for communication, which are directly inherited from the corresponding constructs defined for Mobile Ambients in [6] . The type analyses for the extended calculus are developed in two steps: first we define a type system that only provides for exchange of capabilities; then we introduce a full-fledged system, where the exchange of values also includes ambient names, and study its properties in detail.
Safe Ambients and Communication
In addition to their ability to move, ambients and processes are now endowed with primitives for communication. As in the original proposal by Cardelli and Gordon, communication is anonymous and asynchronous, and takes place inside ambients. The new typed syntax is defined by the following extensions to the productions given in Section 2: 
Exchanging Capabilities
As advocated by Cardelli and Gordon [6] , communication of names should be rare in distributed systems, because knowing the name of an ambient gives full control over it; instead, communication of capabilities should be commonplace, as it allows controlled interaction between ambients. Our first type system takes this view to its extreme, and limits communication to the sole exchange of capabilities.
The resulting system is somewhat restrictive, but nevertheless interesting as it is based on a rather smooth and simple extension of the system discussed in Section 3. The basic observation for the new system is that capabilities and processes can be typed uniformly: in fact, given that process types describe the behavior of processes in terms of the capabilities those processes may exercise, it is natural to associate process types to capabilities as well 9 . Based on this observation, the type system is easily defined by taking the type Î of exchange values to be the type È of processes, and by introducing new rules for typing capabilities in isolation. These rules, together with a new (PREFIX) rule replace the previous (ACTION ) and (ACTION ) rules from Section 3. In addition, of course, we have new typing rules for input and output processes.
The intuition underlying the new system can be explained as follows. Process types now trace two different kinds of information:´ µ the (implicit and explicit) behavior of a process, and´ µ the behavior resulting from the exchange of capabilities via communication.
The typing of capabilities, in the rules (CAP) characterizes capabilities as directly determining process behavior, observable at different nesting levels. The format of the rules is consistent with the format we used in Figure 1 and will use in the full-fledged system of Section 8.3: the algorithmic version of the rules (CAP ) and (CAP ) would derive the minimum types´ Ô µ and´ Ô µ, respectively.
The rule (PATH) simply collects the behavior associated with the capabilities on the path, and the rule (PREFIX) combines the behavior determined by the prefix with the behavior of the continuation process. Again, we have given the non-algorithmic versions of the rules: in the algorithmic versions of the rules (PATH) and (PREFIX) the type deduced by the conclusions would be the union of the two types deduced by the two respective premises. The rule (INPUT) implicitly assumes that every capability input by a process may potentially be exercised: this is enforced by the constraint É È, requiring that the process exhibit in its type the behavior that may result from exercising any capability that is input by the process. Dually, the rule (OUTPUT) identifies the type of the capability being output with the type of the process that outputs it: this is required for type safety. To see that, assume Å È, and consider the process´Ü ÉµÈ Å . This process type-checks with the rules above only if É È, and the type assigned to È is a super-type of È, which therefore provides a safe approximation for the behavior È may acquire in the exchange of Å.
Notice that the type used for the parameter of input processes can be any type, not necessarily a closed one. This is convenient, as it allows a more liberal typed syntax in which the type annotations are not necessarily closed, and their closure is automatically computed by the system. In Section 5, we showed that this can indeed be accomplished by the type reconstruction algorithm: in the new system, the type closure is implicitly computed by the rule (INPUT) which subsumes the possibly ill-formed parameter type É, to the well-formed (i.e., closed) type È. From the last observation, it directly follows that the typing rules can be reformulated and based on an untyped syntax, by simply replacing (INPUT) rule above with the rule given next:
Discussion. While easily accommodated in the basic type system, the solution we just outlined is somewhat unsatisfactory. The problem is that representing behavior and exchange with process types effectively amounts to identifying the communication of a capability with the act of exercising it. Clearly, this leads to a rather coarse type analysis, because an ambient could exchange a capability without ever exercing it. A further source of unwanted approximation arises from type closure: take for instance the ambient È ℄ È, and assume that È opens another ambient enclosing an output process Å É. Then, type closure implies that È must subsume the type É, even though È does not include any input process, and therefore it has no way to effectively exercise the capability.
Exchanging names and capabilities
A more effective analysis results from distinguishing the two forms of behavior a process exhibits: the capabilities it may exercise from the capabilities it may exchange. This can be accomplished by enriching the syntax of types as defined by the following productions. Let È denote the usual triples´Ä Å AEµ, with Ä Å AE ¾ ¾ Å , and Å denoting type capabilities, exactly as in Section 3. The structure of types is similar to that of the original type system for Mobile Ambients by Cardelli and Gordon [7] . Process types describe the two components of process behavior: the direct behavior resulting from exercising capabilities, traced by È, and the exchange behavior resulting from communication, traced by Ï . As we anticipated, communication can now exchange either capabilities (of type Ì ) or ambient names (of type Ï ℄). The type Ï ℄ is assigned to ambients names of domain whose internal exchanges, if any, are of type Ï . The typed syntax is similar to the previous, with the only restrictions that new names may only be declared at types of the form Ï ℄.
Environments and Typing Rules
The binding environments of the new type system are still defined as pairs of Type Environments, denoted by , and Domain Environments, denoted by ¥. Domain Environments defined as in Section 3, as finite maps from domain names to the component È of process types. Type environments, instead, have a different structure as they now map ambient names to the newly defined ambient types of the form Ï ℄, and input variables to value types Î .
Interestingly the definition of closure, boundedness and coherence from Section 3 work just as well with the new structure of types. The typing rules, instead, are different: they derive five different forms of
Type and Environment Formation
(TYPE Ë ) ¥ ¥ ¥ Ë (TYPE MESSG) ¥ Ï ¾ ÓÑ´¥µ ¥ Ï ℄ (TYPE PROC) ¥ Ï fn´Èµ ÓÑ´¥µ ¥ È ÐÓ× ¥ È Ï ℄ (ENV ½ ) ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ (ENV ¾ ) ¥ ¥ ¥ Ï Ü ¾ ÓÑ´ µ ¥ Ü Ï ¥
Typing of Terms
(NAME)
Typing of Processes
The rules for typing capabilities mimic those defined in [7] for Mobile Ambients. In particular the rule for ÓÔ Ò demands that the exchange types of the opened and the opening ambient coincide: this explains why the rule (CAP ) is split into two rules. Note that all types occurring in processes are required to be well formed. This is unfortunate, as it requires the typing annotations for terms to be built around closed types, but at the same time necessary for safety.
Type Safety
The proof of type safety follows essentially the same argument described in Section 4, based on subject reduction. For the latter, Lemma A.6 is easily proved for the new system: one only needs an additional case for the new structural rule for paths, which follows immediately by an inspection of the typing rules. In addition, one needs the following revised form of Lemma A.7 and a substitution lemma, to handle communication.
In both cases the proof is standard. The definition of immediate exhibition of a capability of Figure 2 does not change, because the input and output processes -´Ü Î µÈ and Å -do contribute to any immediate exhibition of capabilities. The same is true of processes in prefix form Å È when (the first capability of) Å is a variable.
The definition of tagged reduction is directly derived from the corresponding definition in Figure 3 with the addition of the structural rule ℄ Å Å , and of a new reduction for communication, namely:
℄´Ü Î µÈ  Å © ℄È Ü Å . Finally, one needs an additional context form to account for contexts built around the input construct:´Ü Î µ ℄.
Given these extensions, the notions of residual and residual behavior are defined exactly as in Definitions 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. Then we have: hand, such processes do not, in fact, have any immediate exhibition: they only exhibit a capability when the variable in the prefix is eventually substituted. Hence, if we can prove that the type of Ü È takes into account the type capabilities of all possible substitutions for Ü, then type safety follows. But this follows directly from subject reduction property and an inspection of the typing rule (PREFIX).
Related Work
We have showed that classical type theoretic techniques provide effective tools for characterizing behavioral properties of mobile agents. Capturing implicit behavior is essential to ensure secure agent interactions: to our knowledge, ours is the first among type systems for Mobile Ambients to have this property. Also, we have showed that in the design of a distributed implementation of the calculus and its type system one finds back features distinctive of real systems. We conclude with comparisons with related work.
Type Systems for Mobile Ambients
Type systems for Mobile Ambients and related calculi have been studied in several papers. The first paper on the subject is by Cardelli and Gordon [7] , where types are introduced to discipline the exchange of values inside ambients. In [4] , Cardelli, Ghelli and Gordon extend the type system of [7] to account for ambient mobility. The new type system provides for a classification of ambients according to simple behavioral invariants: specifically, the type system identifies ambients that remain immobile, and ambients that may not be dissolved by their environment. In [12] , Levi and Sangiorgi define a suite of type systems for their Safe Ambients, which also characterize behavioral properties of ambients, such as immobility and singlethreadedness: based on these invariants, they prove interesting equivalences for well-typed processes. In [1] , Amtoft, Kfoury and Pericas develop a type and effect system for Mobile Ambients that provides support for polymorphic exchanges within ambients. Work on combining their type system with the one presented here is part of our and their current collaborative research.
The type system closest to ours is the one presented by Cardelli, Ghelli, and Gordon in their recent paper on Ambient Groups [5] . Although their and our motivations are somewhat orthogonal -they refine previous work on static detection of ambient mobility, we give a type-theoretic account of security by defining and enforcing security policies for ambients-the two solutions have several similarities. If we disregard the security layer of our type system, our notion of ambient domain is essentially the same as their notion of group. Also, ambient behavior is characterized in both type systems in terms of sets built around domains (or equivalently groups). In [5] each group is associated with sets that identify which groups ambients of group may potentially cross or open. In our type system, we directly associate ambient domains with type-level capabilities with similar information content. However, our type system is superior in precision, as our type-capability sets are constructed in ways that allow implicit and hidden mobility to be statically detected. That is not always the case in the type system of [5] : only the first of the two attacks we discussed in the examples of Section 1.1 is detected by the type system of [5] 10 .
A further difference is the presence in [5] of a novel (and quite interesting) construct for dynamic group creation, a primitive that is not available for our version of mobile ambients. While we believe that this construct could be included in our type system, it would certainly complicate type reconstruction. Besides our specific interests in security issues, that are somewhat disregarded in [5] , type reconstruction and the distributed version of the system (neither of which is discussed in [5] ) represent further important differences between the two papers.
Static Analysis for Mobile Ambients
Although developed in a different framework, and based on different techniques, our work on type-based analysis has the same goals as F. and H.R. Nielson's study for control and data flow analysis for Mobile Ambients [15, 17] and achieves similar results.
In fact, our type reconstruction algorithm may be seen as an abstract control flow analysis where ambient behavior is abstracted upon in terms of domain behavior. In particular if we consider the work in [15] the resulting analysis is very similar to the one detailed here up to Section 5. In some respects, our analysis is more precise as we use co-capabilities and the three-levels structure of types to refine it. Furthermore, as we have shown, out analysis scales to the distributed version of the calculus, an issue that is not discussed in in [15] . In other respects, however, the analysis presented in [15] is finer than ours since they collect not only the actions emitted by an ambient, as we do, but also the set of its possible parents. This information is then used to refine the analysis as it allows one to disregard capabilities that may not be exercised: for example, the capability ÓÙØ is included in an ambient's behavior only if the target ambient is among the current ambient's parents. In fact, there seems to be no fundamental impediment in refining our system to perform the kind shape analysis proposed in [15] . Plans of future research work may include work in that direction.
The analyses of [15, 17] have been enhanced in [9, 11] by the use of abstract interpretation. In these works, as in [16] the complexity of the analyses is also studied, an issue that we completely overlooked here and leave for future work. 
From (1), the left judgments of (2) and (6), by Lemma A.5:4, we know that Ò ¾ É . From this and from (3), Ò ¾ ¥´ µ . From the left judgment of (5), we also know that Ó Ò ¾ È . From this and from (6), Ó Ò ¾ ¥´ µ . Summarizing we have, Ò ¾ ×ÝÒ´¥´ µ ¥´ µ µ. From this,
and from ¥ ¥, we know that ¥ ÓÙÒ × ¥´ µ. From this, and from the right judgment of (6) 
Now, the type of the reduct derives from (9), (7), and the left judgment of (6) 
From the left judgments of (2) Next, consider one step of tagged-reduction from ½ ℄Ê℄. If ℄Ê is not a sub-occurrence of the redex nor is the redex a suboccurence of ℄Ê, then the proof is trivial. The same holds if ℄Ê is a sub-occurrence of the redex but it is not one of the tagged processes involved in the reduction. If the redex is a sub-occurrence of ℄Ê, then the proof follows by subject reduction. The remaining cases are when ℄Ê is one of the processes involved in the reduction: we work out the interesting cases below, the remaining cases are similar and simpler. Note that the theorem is stated for ambient occurrences and not generic occurrences. Indeed the result does not hold for generic processes since in DSSA we did not modify the (open) rule to check that opened ambients are well-typed. In all three cases completeness follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that set-union is monotonic.
C Type Reconstruction
È È ¼ Ò È ´ µÈ ¼ Directly, by induction hypothesis.
È È ½ È ¾ Let ¥ ½ Ê env´ È ½ µ, È ½ Ê type´ È ½ µ, ¥ ¾ Ê env´ È ¾ µ and È ¾ Ê type´ È ¾ µ. 
From (7) and (8) 
From (11) and Proposition C.1, we deduce ¥ ¥. From this, (ENV), and (NAME) we obtain: ¥
By construction ¥ ¥ . Thus by (9) , the induction hypothesis, and Lemma C.5 we deduce ¥ È ¼ È
Finally from (10) and Proposition C.2(3) we have
The result follows from (12), (13) , and (14) 
D Generalized Type Safety
The generalized version of type safety, for processes in arbitrary form, is subtler and requires more complex definitions. The problem is that restrictions may extrude tagged processes and thus inherently change the set of actions exhibited by the latter. For example consider the following process:
´ µ ÓÙØ Ò ℄ ℄
Imagine that we want to consider the set of residuals of . According to the actual definition we have to tag , that is, ℄ ´ µ ÓÙØ Ò ℄ ℄, and apply the reduction rule (open tag). But to apply this rule we must first extrude the restriction´ µ from . The final result is: µ´℄ ℄ ℄ Ò ℄µ Now according to the previous definitions Ò ℄ is a residual of , and the former emits Ò (more precisely Ò ℄ Ò ). However it is clear that cannot emit Ò as the extruded restrictions always blocks this action. And indeed the type system does not require Ò to belong to the type of .
The above example shows that scope extrusion requires that extruded restrictions are traced by the extruded tags. Thus, the general form of tagged processes will be ℄ È , where is a type environment.
Given the extended notion of tags, we then define a congruence rule for scope extrusion:
℄ ´ µÈ ´ µ℄ È (16) In the following, we omit the type environment in tags unless it really matters. The tagged-reduction rules and the remaining structural congruence rules are as before, with the only exceptions that now tags carry type environments with them. We extend the type system with an additional type rule for tagged processes and define the relation also for tagged processes:
(TYPE TAG)
The way capability exhibition is defined for tagged processes justifies why residuals are now defined as tagged processes and why tags have to store environments: if we did not, then by the rule (16) a residual could exercise a capability that in the original occurrence would have been blocked by a restriction. If we consider again the example (15) and the set of -residuals of , then this set contains ℄ Ò ℄ which, according to the new rule for defined above, no longer emits Ò .
Finally, the definition of · is as before, but now it uses the new definitions of exhibition and residual.
